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Square Circles?!! Restoring Rationality to
the Same-Sex "Marriage" Debate
by JEFFERY J. VENTRELLA, ESQ.*
Domestic partnership or civil union has passed in every country
in the European Union, and in Japan and Canada. Why not in
America? Because we are the only one that's really Christian.
It seems to me that the single biggest enemy to homosexuality is
Christianity.... Any self-respecting gay should be an atheist.
And so I think it's a battle worth fighting, not because I want to
live behind a white picket fence and be faithful to a lover and
both wear wedding rings - I think that's stupid.'
We find everywhere a clear recognition of the same
truth... because of a general recognition of this truth the
question has seldom been presented to the courts.... These,
and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume
of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterance that
this is a Christian nation.... We find everywhere a clear
recognition of the same truth.... Religion, morality and
knowledge [are] necessary to good government, the
* Mr. Ventrella, a Hastings graduate (Class of 1985) and former Production Editor of this
journal currently serves the Alliance Defense Fund as Senior Vice-President, Strategic
Training. www.telladf.org. He also teaches ethics and apologetics at the graduate level.
In addition to his considerable litigation and teaching experience, Mr. Ventrella has
formally debated same-sex "marriage" approximately 30 times facing a veritable "who's
who" of national same-sex "marriage" advocates: William Eskridge of Yale; Andrew
Koppleman of Northwestern; Dale Carpenter of Minnesota; Evan Wolfson of Freedom to
Marry; Kate Kendall and Shannon Minter of the National Center for Lesbian Rights;
Roger Pilon of CATO; John Davidson of Lambda Legal; Molly McKay of Equity
California, and the list continues: Lawyers, Ph.Ds, Deans, Professors, elected officials, and
of course, numerous ACLU operatives. For a popular narrative explicating the
philosophy underlying these debates, see, Jeffery J. Ventrella, No Debate About It,
CHRISTIAN CULTURE (March 2005). The views he expresses herein are his own - and
are true.
1. Merrell Noden, Edmund White's Own Story, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY
(March 10, 2004), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-paw/archivenew/PAW03-04/10-
0310/features2.html.
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preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind.2
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being.
We the People of the State of California, grateful to Almighty
God for our freedom....
Preface
Whether one is for it or against it, "God talk" stills occurs in the
public square of this nation, one nation (under God). But there is
certainly a welter of opinion on how this plays out in the public
square. Given these divergent and often conflicting perspectives, how
does one rationally address the legal matters of the public square?
"Rock, paper, scissors," though quite efficient, is certainly less than
appropriate. And now same-sex "marriage" visits the public square.
How does one construct a legally coherent marriage jurisprudence?
Perhaps one should begin with a different and more focused
question: why is same-sex "marriage" a topic that more often than
not, generates more heat, than light? To this question, the answer is
straightforward. In American culture, same-sex "marriage" is a topic
that "violates" the three taboos of polite public discourse: sex,
politics, and religion. And yet, to properly address the same-sex
"marriage" question requires squarely and realistically facing these
supposed taboos - and how they integrate with law.
This article seeks to recapture reasoned discourse regarding
these "hot button" topics with an eye toward vanquishing from the
public debate specious reasoning and fallacious contentions. The goal
is to promote a rational assessment of this issue - to generate more
light, than heat. The conclusion, at least to the unbiased rational eye,
will be that to advocate same-sex "marriage" is logically equivalent to
seeking to draw a "square circle": One may passionately and sincerely
persist in pining about square circles, but the fact of the matter is, one
will never be able to actually draw one.
Now, to be sure, marriage is in crisis in America,5 and it is
decidedly not the fault of those who practice homosexual conduct.
2. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458, 465-471 (1892).
3. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313,318 (1952).
4. CAL. CONST. pmbl. (1849).
5. Key contributors to this crisis include the advent of so-called "no-fault" divorce
schemes, corrupted notions of patriarchy (see www.patriarchy.org (identifying and
critiquing distorted notions of male headship)), and ecclesiastical abdication in the face of
eroding marital integrity.
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Nevertheless, the marriage crisis cannot and will not be ameliorated
by deconstructing the one institution which has been acknowledged to
be "the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization.' '6 Same-sex "marriage" presents a radical departure, a
structural deconstruction, from both American jurisprudence as well
as from the Western legal tradition which spawned it. Tradition is not
necessarily normative, but departing from it requires rational
justification - something more than mere personal preference.
This article by design travels beyond mere technical "legal"
argument and demonstrates that both the concept and practice of
same-sex "marriage" lacks rational cogency, and that therefore, the
State ought not to endorse it. The public square has no room for
square circles, because like the Tooth Fairy, they do not really exist.
Introduction
Though this article focuses on rationality, the same-sex
"marriage" debate is not a mere set of abstract contentions. This
issue transcends propositional "black letter" law; it touches people -
all people - both publicly and privately. And, it touches the future.
This is why recovering rationality is both crucial and rudimental.
Addressing and resolving an issue that concerns all without resorting
to guns and bazookas underscores that being human matters. How
issues are resolved matters. Animals "resolve differences" in an
entirely different way. People should not. This is why restoring
rationality must be a priority, especially with respect to marriage
jurisprudence.
Marriage is a watershed issue that cannot be decided by political
shibboleths, opinion polls, or by merely emoting civil rights jargon.
Because marriage is so important to humanity, it behooves all
advocates to approach the question rationally and to eschew
fallacious assertions and inflammatory rhetoric. To erode rationality
will ultimately erode being human.
All advocates must guard against the temptation to employ
pragmatic methodologies, such as seeking at all costs for the ends to
justify the means.7 Rational discourse for the public square requires
6. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (emphasis added).
7. See, Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004). A
classic instance of this defective "ends justifies the means" tactic occurred when the City
and County of San Francisco purported to issue - in defiance of extant law - marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Thankfully, an informed (and unanimous) California
Supreme Court invalidated this antinomian conduct. And this compromised methodology
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more.
From a legal perspective, good advocates must contextualize the
debate - and the debate must be balanced with principle, nor parsed
with preferences. Accordingly, as with any truly effective lawyering,
good advocates (especially when dealing with foundational societal
institutions) will not ignore history, precedent or the role of inference.
Sadly, however, many proponents of same-sex "marriage" do just
that: ignore or abandon the fundamental pillars of a full-orbed and
balanced advocacy.
When rationality is recovered and when history, precedent and
inference are consulted, the analytic barrenness of same-sex
"marriage" becomes evident. And good lawyers will know the
difference.
Discussion
A child, who notoriously despises vegetables, but loves French
fries, was coaxed to try eating onion rings. Upon seeing the golden
batter and smelling the familiar fried-foods odor, he eagerly
consumed this new, but promising snack. When asked whether he
liked what he had tasted, he exclaimed: "Yes, Dad, I like onion rings,
but there's just one thing: they have onions in them!"
Indeed: onion rings do contain onions; without onions, they cease
to be onion rings. In the same way, marriage is structured both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, marriage consists of
two-and only two - persons; qualitatively, marriage consists of the
union of a male and a female. Absent these essential components, the
social construct ceases to be marriage.
The law understands this point. The Court, when challenged to
deconstruct marriage via polygamy, affirmed marriage's fundamental
essence by acknowledging marriage to be "the union for life of one
man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony. "8
Words have meanings and those meanings cannot simply be
ignored or conveniently (that is, arbitrarily) be reconfigured without
justification.
Sadly, the current debate often attempts just that by jettisoning
this and other foundational considerations. If the resolution to the
exists beyond the courtroom as evidenced by the barrage of "hate mail" directed to the
Alliance Defense Fund and its attorneys, including used condoms, pornography, and
personal threats. These actions indicate that rationality has departed - and starkly so -
from the methods of some.
8. Murphy, supra note 7, at 103 (emphasis added).
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marriage debate is to be rational - as opposed to simply the arbitrary
preferences of one group or another - rationality must be restored.
Marriage is a human institution. Animals mate; humans marry.
Therefore, marriage as an human institution must reflect human
experience and human anthropology.
A. Courting the Marriage Debate: Preconditions for Returning to
Rational Legal Discourse
Before any specific matter can be rationally addressed, certain
preconditions must be presupposed - otherwise rational discourse
itself cannot exist. For instance, if words lack fixed meaning, then
debate itself becomes meaningless.
The next section will selectively set forth some key matters that,
once recognized, will spark rational discussion of the same-sex
"marriage" question.
1. Promoting Argument Rather than Breeding Quarrels
In popular culture, having an "argument" connotes something at
best negative: conflict, anger, and decibels. This does not speak well
of popular culture, which has lost its collective ability to analyze
matters for their truth or falsity. This analysis, properly done, is done
by argumentation.
Sadly, bad quarrels often obfuscate or negate good arguments
and this should not be, especially when lawyers advocate. Too often a
discussion degenerates into a quarrel and the rational development of
argument withers into analytic anorexia.
Debates are won or lost however, as the truth is pursued by
argumentation. Debates presuppose that truth exists (a "right"
answer); otherwise, the very process of debating this issue (or any
other issue) would be meaningless. Accordingly, and especially given
this hot button issue, advocates must diligently seek to eradicate
quarreling from their rhetorical arsenal.
The indicia of quarreling, though variable, are unmistakable:
fallacious reasoning,9 loaded slogans,"0  arbitrary assertions,"
9. See infra pp. 112-116.
10. These efforts can be classified as constituting "bumper sticker" jurisprudence, as
if merely invoking shibboleths and sound bites of legal jargon - "equality," "due
process," "civil rights," "discrimination" - can somehow transform an unsound argument
into a cogent jurisprudential justification. True advocacy must press beyond press release
language and pursue the analytic substance of the claim at issue.
11. The two great intellectual sins include contradiction and arbitrariness. One
illustration: the same-sex "marriage" advocates often simply assume that marriage
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emotional appeals, 2 equivocation, 3 and anecdotal narratives.14 None
of these ploys can stand alone and in many cases, they simply spawn
tractionless quarrels rather than advancing the jurisprudential
argument.
2. Acknowledging that Both Sides Assert Moral Claims
Frequently, universities when sponsoring public debates
regarding same-sex "marriage" will ask the participants to focus on
the "legal," not the "moral" issues. 5 This request is often made as if
some sophisticated analytic point has been drawn. Nothing could be
further from the truth.
This same point recurs from the mouths of same-sex "marriage"
advocates, who contend that he or she is not discussing the moral
issue, only the legal issue. 6 Again, this distinction undercuts
rationality. Why?
In the nature of the case, a debate focuses on (at least) two
positions. The advocates are contending as to each position that their
position ought to be the law. Stated differently, this debate is about
what the law ought to be. The advocates therefore appropriately are
asserting that the law ought to be a certain way, and not the other
between close relatives should be proscribed, or that marriage consists of the union of two
- and only two - persons. Upon the rationales typically advanced by same-sex
"marriage" advocates, however, these positions are more a product of arbitrary
assumption rather than principled analysis as will be shown. See infra p. 107, or footnote
19.
12. All too common in this debate is the claim of supposed "unfairness" depicted with
some sympathetic choreographed "couple" simply seeking to "marry the person they
love." This may be good rhetoric, but it is deplorable law. There never has been a legal
right to "marry the person you love." See infra pp. 149-51 or footnotes 143 through 150.
Instead, this is just a calculated raw appeal to emotion devoid of legal justification or
rationality.
13. See infra pp. 114-116, or footnotes 50 through 56.
14. Personal biographical narratives, while occasionally interesting, lack logical force.
So, merely relating that "my life changed after being married to my lesbian partner in
Canada because my sense of self-esteem and personal fulfillment were maximized" justify
nothing in this legal debate - one way or another. Compare e.g., comments made
regarding Barbara Cox's remarks at a same-sex "marriage" debate, March 24, 2004, at the
University of San Diego, The Legal Debate Over Same Sex Marriage; An Interview with
Jeffery J. Ventrella, J.D., by Dr. Roger Wagner, The Word, PenPoint at http://
www.scccs.org/scccs/word/PenPointArticle.asp?id=40.
15. This has been the case in a number of the author's public debates, including those
conducted for the law schools at the University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 16, 2004), the
University of San Francisco (Apr. 24,2004) and others.
16. This was the mantra this author heard from ACLU representative, Denise
Lieberman, during a debate conducted at St. Louis University (Oct. 27, 2004). The Red
Sox captured the World Series that same day. Coincidence?
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way.
Such evaluative claims are decidedly moral claims -
determining the "oughtness" of a particular position. More
importantly, resolving such claims requires and presupposes an
appeal to a transcendent standard (such as the laws of logic) because
that is the only way to truly answer a moral question.7 Otherwise, the
entire debate is nothing more than an exercise of sound and fury
signifying nothing. So, to restore rationality to the same-sex
"marriage" debate requires every advocate to candidly acknowledge
that everyone is making a moral claim of some type. The issue is
which moral claim can be justified."8
3. Remembering that Words Really Do Have Meanings
On a related note, because debates pursue truth, it is axiomatic
that words must have meanings. If words lack meanings, then debate
itself is pointless. 9 This should be self-evident, but unfortunately,
with the encroachment of post-modernity into jurisprudence,' a more
intentional approach is necessary.'
17. This is also true because no argument can prove everything; every argument must
have a fixed starting point, such as the laws of reasoning, fundamental notions of human
biology and the like. To ignore such considerations does not negate them any more than a
spoiled child, who thrusts his fingers into his ears and screams "I can't hear you! I can't
hear you!" negates his loving parent's corrective admonitions.
18. The proscriptions against bestiality and same-sex adult incest can only be justified
upon moral grounds - the subjective "yuck factor" often invoked by same-sex "marriage"
advocates to dismiss these admittedly unpleasant, but plainly logical implications to their
positions, carries no philosophical water.
19. One is reminded of the now classic "Does God Exist?" debate convened in 1985
at the University of California at Irvine between Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen (a Christian) and
Dr. Gordon Stein (an atheist). During one exchange Dr. Bahnsen noted that since
debates presuppose the existence and reliability of the laws of logic, Dr. Stein, as a
materialist, loses by showing up. How? As a materialist, Dr. Stein denied the existence of
anything non-corporeal. However, the laws of logic are decidedly non-corporeal: they are
abstract, absolute, and universal. Because Dr Stein "used logic" to advocate a position
that, if true, would disprove the possibility of the logic he was employing, his position
logically (!) imploded. Accordingly, Dr. Stein, by "showing up," lost. Both men are now
deceased, and thus, someone has definitively "won" this debate. An audio version can be
obtained from http://www.rctr.org/ap5.htm.
20. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights
Philosophy, 80 N.C. L. REV. 371 (2002); Paul D. Carrington, Incorrect Speech, Incorrect
Hearing: A Problem of Postmodern Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 404 (2003); Lars
Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV.
1133 (2004); Matthew McNeil, The First Amendment Out on Highway 61: Bob Dylan,
RL UIPA, and the Problem with Emerging Postmodern Religion Clauses Jurisprudence, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1021 (2004).
21. This author notes that apologist Dr. Francis Schaeffer often remarked, that
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This means at a minimum, that advocates must candidly
acknowledge both the legal and cultural meaning of marriage.'
Marriage law cannot be decontextualized merely to support
someone's trendy preferences.
4. Recognizing that True Knowledge Must be Justified
Two people were chatting. One opined that he knew how many
ants lived in a designated ant hill in East Africa at 9:07 in the
morning: 1,304,562. His friend was incredulous, since his friend had
never visited Africa, let alone conducted a census of any ant hill. To
his astonishment, a third party accurately calculated the number of
ants living in that certain ant hill at that certain time in East Africa:
1,304,562. Amazing. But...
Now, given this scenario, the question is, can it truly be said that
the friend actually knew the number of ants? Or, more plausibly, was
his astonishingly accurate census simply what might be called "a lucky
guess?" The answer is obvious: the friend guessed correctly, but he
did not - philosophically speaking - know the quantity of ants.
Why?
If reasoning is to be returned to legal advocacy and especially the
same-sex "marriage" debate, then advocates must restore the notion
that knowledge - to be knowledge - must be justified, if it is to be
anything more than opinion or a "lucky guess."23
Mere conclusory assertions - without more - are not
justifications of the point, and hence, are unreliable. Legal positions
ought not to be resting on unjustified and thus unreliable premises.
Strenuous and sincere argument that cannot be justified produces
arbitrary and therefore, useless jurisprudence.
5. Distinguishing Marriage's Definition from Marriage Regulation
Here is a test: review the following and then answer a simple
question: With eyes closed, imagine a mermaid; fix the mermaid in
the mind. Now, answer this question: what color is the mermaid's
hair? In a group, the answers will vary, even though every person
focused on a mermaid. Why?
The explanation centers on what constitutes the essence of
"mermaidness." While the hair color of mermaids can vary
worldviews such as post-modernity are more often caught, than taught.
22. See infra pp. 116-124.
23. See generally, ROBERT REYMOND, THE JUSTIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE
(Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Company, Phillipsburg, New Jersey, 1976).
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considerably, in every case, the subject mermaid has a fish body with
a female upper torso. Otherwise, the participants would not be
imagining a mermaid. Instead, they would be imagining something
else, but certainly not a mermaid. The same is true in the same-sex
"marriage" debate.
Without question, marriage as an institution pre-existed the
State. Marriage transcends law; the law did not create marriage.
Rather, the law recognizes and regulates marriage. As the Court
noted: states may "regulate the mode of entering [marriage], but they
do not confer the right."24
This point is often missed in today's same-sex "marriage"
debates. Analytically, the distinction that must be drawn is between
the thing's definition - its essence - and its regulation. Marriage, as
structured as the union of one man and one woman, is subject to
regulation, but it ought not to be subject to structural obliteration -
otherwise it ceases to be marriage. It becomes in effect an onion-less
onion ring.
The law has historically recognized the essence of marriage as
being the union of one man and one woman. 5 Now, the law regulates
that pre-existing structure: establishing, for example, ages of consent,
degrees of consanguinity, residency requirements, capacity, grounds
for divorcement, et al. But in every case, these regulations serve the
essence or definition of marriage; they do not deconstruct it. Proper
regulation ought not to destroy the thing regulated, yet that is exactly
26
what same-sex "marriage" and plural marriage would do.
Accordingly, it is analytically confused as well as disingenuous
for a same-sex "marriage" advocate to claim, as many do,27 that
because marriage regulation periodically changes, that "therefore"
marriage's definition, its essence, also should change. This is a
fallacious non sequitur. To restore rationality to the debate, all
advocates must abandon immaterial assertions regarding regulation.
6. Admitting that Animus is a Red Herring
A sad chapter in the same-sex "marriage" debate stems from
24. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78 (1877) (emphasis added).
25. See infra pp. 116-118.
26. Same-sex "marriage" impugns marriage's qualitative essence; plural marriage
impugns marriage's quantitative essence. In both cases, marriage's structure is
transmogrified.
27. See generally, Freedom to Marry at http://www.freedomtomarry.org.
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perceptions and accusations of animus.8 The assertion is typically
made that those who oppose same-sex "marriage" are "homophobic"
and "anti-gay," etc. This misses the analytic point completely.
On a personal note, this author opposes same-sex "marriage" not
because he is a member of the Flat Earth Society or some equivalent
to the Ku Klux Klan, or is homophobic. 29  Rather, same-sex
"marriage" ought to be opposed because it cannot be justified legally
or philosophically.
Moreover, note that what is being asserted is not "stopping
homosexuals from marrying." The opposition to same-sex
"marriage," while it may impact those who engage in homosexual
conduct, likewise impacts those who do not. The focus of the
argument is directed to preserve the quantitative and qualitative
structure of marriage: the union of one man and one woman. Sexual
predilections are irrelevant, nor can animus be inferred. Rather, the
animus assertion consists entirely of rhetorical flourishes designed to
shift the debate from its focus: from the structure of marriage to some
imagined civil rights context. °
Legally, an assertion of animus or invidious discrimination
cannot be sustained under extant precedent. Neither explicit
discrimination nor discrimination by "disparate impact" is
unconstitutional unless motivated by a purpose to harm a protected
group.31 The federal courts will "ascertain the purpose of a statute by
28. To be sure, groups - who will not even be dignified by identifying them - do
exist that while purporting to be speaking for God, lace all communication with strident
invective, animosity, and personal ridicule. Neither this author, nor the Alliance Defense
Fund condones such sentiment or its methodology. Yet to be candid, on the other hand,
there are also those within the sphere of homosexual advocacy groups that likewise color
their rhetoric with uncharitable (and unsupportable) assertions, such as Evan Wolfson's
repeated line that asserts in effect that those who oppose same-sex "marriage" "are
opposed to any measure of protections for gay families. If we were arguing for oxygen,
they would be against it." Such nonsense does not belong in rational discourse. See, e.g.,
Thomas Peele, Legal Minds Gear Up for Gay Marriage Fight, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2004, ("Same-sex marriage opponents 'are opposed to any measure of protections
for gay families. If we were arguing for oxygen, they would be against it,' said Evan
Wolfson of New York-based Freedom to Marry.").
29. But, there certainly does appear to be something resembling homophobia-phobia
manifested by some in the culture.
30. See infra pp. 134-36. The misleading notion that opposing same-sex "marriage" is
analogous to racial discrimination will be addressed subsequently.
31. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(Proof of discriminatory purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
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drawing logical conclusions from its text, structure, and operation."3
Under intermediate scrutiny, the alleged discriminatory statute must be
purposely designed to harm an identifiable group. A court must find
that the statute was enacted "because of, not merely in spite of, its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 3
Marriage in California, for example (and in all cultures and at all
times for that matter), has always meant a union between a man and a
woman. The text, structure, and operation of the California Marriage
Statutes reveal a purpose to preserve and protect the societal
advantages marriage has conferred from time immemorial upon society.
The Marriage Statutes do not remotely reflect a purpose to spitefully
harm homosexuals.
In Tuan Anh Nguyen, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute for children born abroad to unwed
parents seeking citizenship through one of their parents. The statute
demanded more exacting proof of paternity than for maternity. The
Court noted the natural biological difference between the mother and
father in that the mother is necessarily present at the time of birth.
This difference made it much easier to prove parenthood through the
mother, than it did through the father. The Court ruled that the
statute's more burdensome requirements to prove paternity did not
violate equal protection. The Court held that gender specific statutes
are constitutional when it "takes into account a biological difference
between the parents. The differential treatment is inherent in a sensible
statutory scheme, given the unique relationship of the mother to the
event of birth. 4
The California Marriage Statutes are plainly gender-neutral. But
the biological differences between opposite-sex and same-sex couples
justify allowing only persons of the opposite-sex to marry.
Procreation and parenting occur directly from the union of a man and
a woman. That this serves the State's interest in replenishing society
with posterity imminently nurtured by both sexes is undeniable.
Marriage statutes do not mask unlawful stereotypes based on
subjective prejudice. Rather, the Statutes recognize an objective
biological complement between women and men not found in same-
sex couples. Equal protection principles do not require that the
legislature ignore this reality. Animus is manifestly a red herring
32. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2001) (emphasis added).
33. Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (emphasis
added).
34. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (emphasis added).
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legally and philosophically.
7. Avoiding Fallacious Reasoning
Good attorneys are quick to note factual discrepancies. Indeed,
trials can often turn on such matters - "the glove doesn't fit." The
slightest jot which should be a tittle can carry great persuasive weight.
Sadly, the same is not true when discrepancies of reasoning appear.
Often they are missed completely, or worse, embraced. Reasoning
has left legal reasoning and this should not be.35 To recapture
rationality will require the humility to recognize that fallacious legal
reasoning ought to be abandoned and this is true for several reasons.
a. A Lawyer's Ethical Duty to Speak Truthfully
Attorneys' communication as attorneys is constrained -
ethically. Lawyers who trumpet free speech may cringe of such
things, but it remains true. The Model Rules require attorneys to
speak candidly and in fact, to speak truthfully. One state puts it this
way:
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL36
(a)A lawyer shall not knowingly:
[(1)] make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer;...
RULE 4.1: TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO
OTHERS
37
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(a)make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b)fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
Trial work is also a truth finding exercise. What happens,
however, is that attorneys fail to "connect the dots" between
reasoning and promoting truth. If one reasons fallaciously, truth is
not promoted, but instead is obscured.
Communicating ethically comprises more than conveying the
35. Jeffery J. Ventrella, Identifying and Refuting Fallacious Argument, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Dec. 1995, at 2.
36. IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2005).
37. See id., R. 4.1.
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conclusion or the object: the car was speeding; the light was green; the
document is privileged. It also includes the process of
communicating, including how the lawyer reasons. To reason in a
fallacious way impedes, rather than promotes, speaking the truth.
For example: "There have always been people who engage in
homosexual conduct; therefore, same-sex 'marriage' should be legal."
Here a notorious fallacy is being used: the naturalistic fallacy, or in
non-technical jargon, an attempt is being made to derive an "ought"
from an "is." The fact that something exists, or even is natural, in no
way implies that it ought to be celebrated let alone enshrined in the
law. Consider these counter examples: "Cystic fibrosis is genetic and
therefore natural; therefore we ought not to seek remediation for it."
Or, "Men lust after women naturally; therefore, rape laws comprise
thinly-veiled gender-based discrimination." Or, "Slavery is universal;
therefore the law ought to continue to protect this vital economic
institution." The "is" cannot derive the "ought."38
b. Recurrent Fallacies in the Marriage Debate
1. Mixed Modalities: Apples, Oranges, and the Occasional Kumquat
A frequent, but fallacious rationale urged for altering marriage's
fundamental structure invokes miscegenation laws. These deplorable
laws proscribed aspects of interracial marriage.39 The analytic
problem with this comparison is that it is fallacious: it mixes
modalities by comparing what amounts to apples with oranges.
The miscegenation cases addressed the misapplication of the
fundamental structure of marriage; they did not obliterate it.
Untouched by those now famous cases, notably Perez v. Sharp ' and
38. At this point, the same-sex "marriage" advocate may cry foul since reference is
often made to the "is" of the historicity of "traditional marriage." This criticism
misconstrues the point and thus lacks merit. Marriage as the union of one man and one
woman is not right because it is traditional; it is traditional because it is right, which is why
the historic cross-cultural evidence validates the case against same-sex "marriage" - the
two situations are quite different.
39. These laws, actuated by racial bigotry and white supremacy, were thankfully
never universally embraced. Moreover, these laws sharply deviated from the common
law, the law that enshrined the Western legal tradition. As such, these laws represented a
radical and unjustifiable departure from the law of marriage. Even so, none of these
deeply flawed laws attacked the structural essence of marriage. Thus, from an analytic
standpoint, proponents of same-sex "marriage" promote a vision for culture and the
public square that is much more radical than the miscegnationists, albeit predicated upon
different motivations. Damage to marriage, however, occurs with both.
40. Perez, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Loving v. Virginia,41 was the notion that marriage consists of the
union of one man and one woman. In fact, these cases underscore
that fundamental essence. While the State, by departing from the
common law, improperly regulated marriage by imposing a racial
restriction, it did not in any way redefine marriage. Instead, the
structure was affirmed. To continue to draw comparisons between
these two situations is to mix modalities and thus reason fallaciously
The true analogue to same-sex "marriage" is not interracial marriage,
but rather polygamy because in each case the advocates are seeking
to alter the essence of marriage's structure. 3
2. Hasty Generalizations: "2 + 2 = 5. Therefore Mathematics is
Useless"
In today's climate of legal positivism, references to the venerable
tradition of the natural law are often, when not summarily dismissed,
greeted with snickers or worse. How one dismisses a legal assertion
however is critical. Is this dismissal justified?
To take one example: in the context of same-sex "marriage,"
advocates who support forced marital restructure dismiss appeals to
the divine or natural law by quoting the lower court's decision in
Loving. There the court stated:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate
continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix."
The advocate then fallaciously asserts that all appeals to the
natural law or religion comprise a flawed contrivance of bigotry. Of
course, another explanation exists and is much more plausible. To
illustrate: Suppose that a man appears and asserts that he is a renown
mathematician; he then emphatically intones repeatedly: "2 + 2 = 5."
41. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. See infra pp. 127-136. The legal assertions predicated upon Loving (equal
protection) will be analyzed subsequently.
43. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU POLICY GUIDE (1992).
The frequent retort to this apt comparison is often (fallacious) name-calling: "extremist,"
etc. The reality is, however, that same-sex "marriage" advocates, notably the ACLU,
understand and for years have quietly understood the logical consequences of same-sex
"marriage": altering the structure of marriage necessitates validating plural marriage as
well as same-sex "marriage."
44. 388 U.S. at 3.
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What should one conclude? That mathematics as an academic
discipline is both flawed and meritless for any and all purposes? Or,
instead, should one conclude that this man's application of
mathematics is mistaken? The answer is obvious. To conclude the
former, however, illustrates the fallacy of hasty generalization.
One may reject the natural law, but predicating that rejection on
one judge's flawed invocation of something that sounds like natural
law is specious. Or put in a different light. "To go to Harvard, one
must be smart; the person supporting same-sex 'marriage' went to
Harvard; therefore, his legal reasoning is sound." 5 Such assertions
lack merit and manifestly so.
3. Ad Hominem Fallacies: "But You're Religious!"
Ad Hominem fallacies argue "against the person" either
positively or negatively. Though such references occur often in
culture - famous athlete A uses Product X; therefore, Product X
must be good - they should be eschewed in legal reasoning. They
provide no logical force whatsoever.
Consider this example: Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned
Parenthood, advocated eugenics and spoke of "a race of
degenerates," the "dead weight of human waste," "racial health, ,46
and "genetically inferior races., 47 Ugly stuff. Would this fact alone
provide a justification for opposing abortion? Hardly, and yet, this is
the same form of argument often strewn before opponents of same-
sex "marriage. ' 48
The volume of such legal miscues can be deafening: "If you
oppose same-sex marriage, you're a narrow-minded bigot!" Or, "You
are employed by a right wing religious organization and as everybody
knows, they can't be right!" Or, "We shouldn't leave rights up to a
popular vote!, 49 The clutter of ad hominem rhetoric must be cleared
45. See infra at nn.47-50. This also illustrates the positive circumstantial ad hominem
fallacy as well.
46. DONALD DE MARCO & BENJAMIN WIKER, ARCHITECTS OF THE CULTURE OF
DEATH 297-300 (2004).
47. MARGARET SANGER, THE PIVOT OF CIVILIZATION 264 (1922).
48. This is not to say that abortion should not be opposed; it certainly should be, but
the rationale underlying that opposition must not be fallacious: Humans need food, water,
and shelter; to deprive humans, by design of food, water, and shelter, simply because the
human resides in a womb is unprincipled and cannot be justified.
49. Perhaps, but perhaps not. Note though, it was the people acting constitutionally
- not the courts - who abolished slavery (white men - 13th Amendment) and granted
women suffrage (white and black men - 19th Amendment). And, the people seeking to
nullify a particularly egregious Court decision via the amendment process enjoys a long
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if rationality is to return to the same-sex "marriage" debate.
4. Equivocation: Good Steaks Are Rare
Another common logical flub involves the careless or imprecise
usage of terminology - like "good steaks are rare."50 In the realm of
the same-sex "marriage" debate, equivocation arises in a number of
ways.
First, it arises when advocates use the term "marriage" in very
different, but unacknowledged ways. For example, advocates for
same-sex "marriage" often predicate their argument upon "marriage"
being a "bundle or package of benefits."51  This starting point,
however, deviates from the law's well-established definition of
marriage as being the legally recognized union of one man and one
woman." The State may and ought to confer benefits to marriage,
but marriage does not consist of those legal incidents. This
equivocation confuses the analysis and transforms marriage into a
mere economic arrangement, something utterly foreign to the
operative law.
Second, in another well-worn example, the same-sex "marriage"
advocate will emotionally intone that she simply wants marital
equality for her relationship. However, when probed, the reality is
very different. "Marriage" as classically understood connotes not
only the union of one man and one woman, but also that marriage is
the exclusive and best context for sexual expression, procreation, and
child rearing. Accordingly, this would be expressed by correlatively
enforcing chastity before marriage, fidelity within marriage, and the
recognition that marriage is the optimal environment for rearing
children.
The same-sex "marriage" advocates, however, want something
very different than those norms implicit in marriage. They want to
maintain and expand a smorgasbord approach: one can choose
marriage vel non, but it is only one of many equally viable options for
history. Indeed, the l1th amendment came to be in response to Chisholm v Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1798). This is how a constitutional republic functions and thus, to say
that a proposed marriage amendment would somehow be undemocratic is both
constitutionally unfounded and historically ignorant.
50. This particular miscue is known as amphibole. Another is, "Eat here, get gas."
Or, "A man is not complete until he is married; when he marries, he's finished."
51. See, e.g., Karen Doering, remarks at University of Florida debate, "Re-Framing
the Debate: Legal and Social Implications of 'Lawrence v. Texas' in the areas of Gay
Marriage, Florida's Gay Adoption Ban and U.S. Military Policy." (Jan. 22, 2004).
52. See infra at pp. 123-26.
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cohabitation - not the preferred or endorsed institution. Until this
equivocation is identified and eradicated, rational progress will be
impeded.
Or consider another example: As mentioned, the invocation of
the natural law is frequently pooh-poohed. But this itself reflects at
best equivocation or at worse ignorance. First, it confuses the natural
law itself with various theories of the natural law. 3 Second, it treats
the various theories as analytic equivalents, which is far from the
case.14 Equivocation, rather than providing clarity by advancing an
argument, muddles the analytic waters and then stirs them. This form
of fallacious reasoning must likewise be rejected.
B. Consummating the Marriage Debate: A Plea for an Informed
Full-Orbed Legal Discourse
No reasoning, especially legal reasoning can occur in a vacuum.
In fact, legal reasoning is tri-perspectival - that is, it involves
applying a standard (a norm or set of norms) by and to persons in
particular situations.55 For example, though the essence of contract
law is "enforcing promises" [normative perspective] - the other
perspectives make plain that not all promises are enforceable: the
promisor must have capacity [personal existential perspective], and
the promisee must not coerce or fraudulently procure assent
[situational perspective].
Why delve into this arcane formulation? Because rationality
demands it and because many same-sex "marriage" advocates express
their positions extracted from the historical (situational), legal
(normative), and/or personal (existential) contexts, the very contexts
or perspectives that necessarily inform the debate. Rational
advocates should consider the Situational, the Normative and the
Personal perspectives. Ignoring any one of these produces a crabbed
and ultimately ineffective or even tyrannical jurisprudence.
1. The Extant Historical [Situational] Perspective: Good Lawyers
53. J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNOW 111, 133 (2003, Spence
Publishing Company, Dallas, Texas).
54. Compare generally, RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE (ISI Books,
Wilmington, Delaware, 2001) (Thomistic version) with J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITrEN ON
THE HEART (Intervarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois, 1997) (classical synthesis) and
ROBERT P. GEORGE, CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES (ISI Books, Wilmington, Delaware,
2003) ("new" natural law).
55. See generally, JOHN M. FRAME, THE DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
(Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Phillipsburg, New Jersey, 1987).
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Don't Ignore History
Marriage laws apply to situations. One zealous advocate framed
the unrestrained freedom to marry question this way:
[E]very man and every woman shall have the free
liberty to marry whom they love, if they can obtain
love and liking of that party whom they should marry,
and neither birth nor portion shall hinder the match,
for we are all of one family of mankind56
These words stem not from the recent flurry of marriage
litigation, nor from the traditional advocates of this cause: ACLU,
Lambda Legal, the Human Rights Campaign, or Freedom to Marry.
Rather, these words were advanced in the 17th century. The issue of
"marital freedom" is not some cutting edge issue of civil rights, as is
often portrayed. Instead, this is an issue that has been discussed and
litigated implicitly and explicitly for centuries.
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court, recognizing
the complementary and communitarian structure of marriage
affirmed marriage's quantitative and qualitative components. In
particular, the Court noted that marriage is "the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization.' ' 7  That being said, it
behooves all involved to resolve the current debate question
correctly. And, only arrogance will attempt to answer this question in
a vacuum, extracted from the collective thinking of the nation's legal
past - the Situational perspective. That history or context will now
be rehearsed, albeit briefly.
The common law has always recognized marriage as a
relationship between a man and a woman 8 without reference to race.
Before any statutes regulated formation or solemnization there was a
"common-law right to form the marriage relation by words of present
assent."5 9 When California, for example, enacted laws early in its
56. Gerrard Winstanley, Leader of the Diggers in 17th-century England, quoted in
JOHN WRITE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT 178 (Don S. Browning and Ian S.
Evison, eds., Westminster John Know Press, Louisville, Kentucky, 1997) (emphasis
added).
57. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
58. See, e.g., Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 440-42 (1907) (finding that a common
law marriage was established by man and woman who lived together and publicly
acknowledged their marriage).
59. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 (1877); cf. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589
(Ky. Ct. App. 1973) ("Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue
licenses for that purpose"). Common law marriage was recognized on evidence of a man
and woman living together and publicly presenting each other as husband and wife.
Travers, 205 U.S. at 440-42.
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history with "certain provisions, different from the rules of the
common law, . . there [was] no attempt made to change the essential
nature of marriage ..... 
The definition of marriage also pre-dates the state and the
nation. As recognized by Baker v. Nelson,61 "marriage as a union of
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of
children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis." The
English term "marriage" has meant the union of a husband and wife,
a man and a woman, since at least the 14th century.62
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized what marriage meant at
common law: the union of "one man and one woman," Murphy v.
Ramsey.63 Throughout the history of the United States, marriage, in a
legal sense, has never meant anything other than the union of a man
and a woman. California laws also reflect and embrace a preexisting
fact at common law: that marriage means the union of a man and a
64woman.
And, these conclusions are confirmed by the regulatory reforms
occurring throughout the Western Legal Tradition. This is true
whether one is speaking of Roman Catholicism's sacramental
reforms, Lutheranism's social estate theory of marriage, the
Calvinists' covenantal reforms, Anglicanism's commonwealth view of
marriage, or even the secular contractual reforms of the
Enlightenment.6'
60. Sesler v. Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486, 486-87 (1889) (emphasis added).
61. 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal
for want of a substantial federal question) (emphasis added).
62. See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary-Tenth Edition 713 (1993)
(definition of "marriage"). See also, Ancient English dictionaries are all consistent with
this meaning. See, e.g., Thomas Dyche & William Pardon, A New General English
Dictionary (1740) (Marriage: "that honourable contract that persons of different sexes
make with one another"); James Buchanan, Linguae Britannicae Vera Pronunciatio
(1757) (Marriage: "A civil contract, by which a man and a woman are joined together");
Noah Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language 185 (1806)
(Marriage: "the act of joining man and woman"); Noah Webster, An American Dictionary
of the English Language 518 (1830) (Marriage: "The act of uniting a man and woman for
life"); James Knowles, A Critical Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language 425
(1851) (Marriage: "The act of uniting a man and woman for life"). The definition has
continued unchanged. See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary - Tenth Edition 713
(1993) ("1 a: the state of being married b: the mutual relation of husband and wife:
WEDLOCK").
63. 114 U.S. 45; See also In re DeLaveaga's Estate, 142 Cal. 158, 171 (1904)
64. See Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055, 1128 (2004)
(Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Since the earliest days of
statehood, California has recognized only opposite-sex marriages.").
65. See generally, WIITE, JR., supra note 57.
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In every instance of regulatory legal reform - whether
ecclesiastically or secularly motivated - in every context and in every
state - viable legal reformation always affirmed the structure, that is,
the essence of marriage. To depart from the considered practice and
analysis on a whim and without significant justification, defies
rationality by ignoring the context, that is, the Situational perspective.
Good lawyers don't ignore history.
2. The Extant Legal [Normative] Perspective: Good Lawyers Don't
Ignore Precedent
Marriage laws apply standards. What are these standards? Is
marriage law a tabla rasa? If not, how have these standards been
articulated and implemented? Only by first answering these
questions can the same-sex "marriage" question be addressed from
the normative perspective.
The reality is that each and every federally-based argument
being advanced in favor of same-sex "marriage" today has been tried,
tested, and has failed. And, good lawyers don't ignore precedent.
In Baker v. Nelson,' the U.S. Supreme Court did not review the
Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling that there is no fundamental right
to same-sex "marriage" under the Ninth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, and that excluding same-sex
couples from marriage does not constitute irrational or invidious
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment. 67 The Minnesota Supreme Court had ruled that the
state's definition of marriage "does not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth,
or 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. "6'
California Supreme Court Justice Kennard recently explained
that Baker,
is a decision... binding on all other courts and public
officials, that a state law restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples does not violate the federal Constitution's
guarantees of equal protection and due process of law.69
Justice Kennard also remarked that,
[u]ntil the United States Supreme Court says otherwise, which
it has not yet done; Baker v. Nelson defines federal
66. 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal
for want of a substantial federal question).
67. See Id. at 186-87.
68. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
69. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th at 1126 (Kennard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis original).
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constitutional law on the question whether a state may deny
70
same-sex couples the right to marry. s
Prior to 1988, plaintiffs like those in Baker had an automatic
right to State Supreme Court review "[b]y appeal, where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution.. . of the United States, and the
decision is in favor of its validity.' On direct appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court "dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. "7 2 This dismissal comprised a decision on the merits thereby
binding all other courts considering the same issues:
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial
federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges
presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed
the judgment appealed from. "They do prevent lower courts from
coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and
necessarily decided by those actions.,
73
The precedential value extends to "the precise issues presented
and necessarily decided .... ,
The Jurisdictional Statement in the Baker appeal specifically
raised the issues currently been bantered about: whether excluding
same-sex couples from marriage: "deprives appellants of liberty and
property in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses
[and]... constitutes an unwarranted invasion of the privacy in
violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.""5 The appellants
also directly raised a claim of a fundamental right to marry "fully
protected by the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. ,
76
Moreover, they claimed that "[tjhe discrimination in this case is
one of gender.,77  They further argued that "[b]y not allowing
appellants the legitimacy of their marriages, the state is denying them
70. Id. at 1127.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (amended 1988).
72. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (emphasis added).
73. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, Baker v. Nelson (409 U.S. 810; 93 S. Ct. 37;
34 L. Ed. 2d 65; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 1164).
76. Id. at 11 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 535 (1923)).
77. Id. at 16 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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this basic right and unlawfully meddling in their privacy.
The Supreme Court's dismissal of this appeal necessarily rejected
of the merits of each of these claims. There is no right to same-sex
"marriage" in the Ninth or 14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.7 ' As shown below, Baker's precedent comports fully
with the Supreme Court's equal protection, and due process
jurisprudence. Good lawyers don't ignore precedent - the
Normative perspective.
3. The Extant Personal [Existential] Perspective: Good Lawyers
Don't Ignore the Role of Inference
Marriage laws apply to people. This is self-evident but its
implications are unfortunately largely overlooked, dismissed, or
ignored.8 Instead, many advocates favoring same-sex "marriage"
treat males and females as being fungible and interchangeable for a
variety of purposes: intimacy, procreation, child rearing, et al. This
Mr. Potato Head exchangeable-parts-view of man cheapens humanity
by ignoring the obvious and beautiful distinctions between mankind
as male and mankind as female. And, these distinctions are crucial to
the marriage question. Design, and the legitimate inferences to be
drawn there from, matter." And, it is precisely these inferences that
generate the State's important interest in regulating and protecting
marriage as between one man and one woman, as opposed to some
other social construct: brothers and sisters, friends, uncles and nieces,
aunts and nephews, and polyamorous communes.'
Courts have always recognized that the relationship between
78. Id. at 18 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Mindel v. United States
Civil Service Commission 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970)).
79. Every published decision has recognized that Baker comprised a binding decision
on the merits. See McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976); Adams v.
Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1036,
1039 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); In re Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 134 (
N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Most recently, see, Wilson v. Ake, No. 8:04-cv-1680-T-30TBM
(M.D. Fla., Jan. 19, 2005).
80. To be sure, same-sex "marriage" advocates do invoke personal testimonies in an
attempt to "humanize" their legal position, see, e.g., www.freedomtomarry.org, but this is
different from addressing the foundational anthropological matters impacting humanity
qua humanity.
81. See discussion infra pp. 141-142.
82. This is precisely why the State does not license these other relational constructs,
even though friends can and should love and can be committed and mutually supportive.
The fact is that not every relationship that manifests love, commitment, privacy, and
dependency can rightly be called "marriage" - nor should they be so denominated.
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procreation and marriage is the reason for State protection of the
institution.83 The D.C. Court of Appeals noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court "has called this right [to marriage] 'fundamental' because of its
link to procreation." 84
This relationship between procreation and marriage was most
recently recognized by the Arizona Court of Appeals:
Indisputably, the only sexual relationship capable of
producing children is one between a man and a woman. The
State could reasonably decide that by encouraging opposite-
sex couples to marry, thereby assuming legal and financial
obligations, the children born from such relationships will
have better opportunities to be nurtured and raised by two
parents within long-term, committed relationships, which
society has traditionally viewed as advantageous for children.
Because same-sex couples cannot by themselves procreate, the
State could also reasonably decide that sanctioning same-sex
marriages would do little to advance the State's interest in
ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term
relationships.5
The Washington Court of Appeals likewise held that:
[Tithe state's refusal to grant a license allowing the appellants
to marry one another is not based upon appellants' status as
males, but rather it is based upon the state's recognition that
our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and
desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children. 8
A Pennsylvania appellate court incisively described the state's
interest in marriage:
Many variations of style can be accommodated within the
concept of marriage and the family but style should and
cannot be confused with substance. The essence of marriage
is the coming together of a man and woman for the purpose of
procreation and the rearing of children, thus creating what we
know to be the traditional family. A goal of society,
government and law is to protect and foster this basic unit of
society. It therefore is entitled to a presumption in its favor
over any other form of lifestyle, whether it be polygamy,
83. This is true, for example, of the California Supreme Court. Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal.
87, 103 (1859) (of the two ends of marriage, the Court identified, they noted, "the first
purpose of matrimony, by laws of nature and society, is procreation."); Sharon v. Sharon,
75 Cal. 1, 33 (1888) ("principal ends of marriage... [is] the procreation of children under
the shield and sanction of the law.") (quoting Stewart on Marriage and Divorce, sec. 103).
84. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 332 (App. D.C. 1995) (emphasis
added).
85. Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 462-63 (2003), review denied, 2004 Ariz.
Lexis 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004).
86. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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communal living, homosexual relationships, celebrate utopian
communities or a myriad of other forms tried throughout the
ages, none of which succeeded in supplanting the traditional
family. The test of equality between the traditional family and
the homosexual relationship cannot be met by the homosexual
relationship. Simply put, if the traditional family relationship
(lifestyle) was banned, human society would disappear in little
more than one generation, whereas if the homosexual lifestyle
were banned, there would be no perceivable harm to society.
It is clearly evident that the concept of family is essential to
society, homosexual relationships are not. A primary function
of government and law is to preserve and perpetuate society,
in this instance, the family. It, therefore, is required to protect
and support the family, which means it must be given every
reasonable presumption in its favor.8 7
Given the history of the State's interest in marriage, states enjoy
a valid, indeed compelling interest in recognizing and extending
benefits to married couples in order to steer procreation into
marriage.' It cannot be credibly said that regulating marriage in
order to steer procreation into an environment so that children
receive optimal nurture89 is anything but sound, both legally and
philosophically.
The vast majority of opposite-sex couples of child-bearing age
will procreate absent deliberate efforts to avoid doing so. It is of
paramount interest to the State whether procreation occurs within or
without the marital bounds because, as a general matter, children
born out of wedlock incur multifarious disadvantages economically,
socially, emotionally and physically.9° Accordingly, the State has a
compelling interest in attempting to steer procreation into marriage.
The issue is not whether any individual parent is or can be a good
parent - parenting skills can be learned. Nor is the issue whether
some children reared in alternative structures do well, or even excel
- some surely do. But as one court importantly noted in a matter
involving an exceptional plaintiff, "law and policy are based on the
general rather than the idiosyncratic."9' It is not irrational to conclude
that the right to marry is and should be linked to the State's interest
87. Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 6 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
88. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long linked procreation to the fundamental right
to marry. Skinner, 316 'U.S. at 541 ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race.")
89. See infra notes 156-164 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 165.
91. Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2001).
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in procreation and the nurture of children within marriages.
In contrast to opposite-sex couples, no same-sex couple will ever
procreate-they may adopt;' they may acquire children through one of
them having an opposite-sex relationship; two women may use some
form of artificial reproductive technology; or two men may use a
surrogate mother. In all these cases, the same-sex couple will rely on
a third person of the opposite-sex. Same-sex "marriage" advocate
William Eskridge concedes this point: "Because same-sex couples
cannot have children through their own efforts, a third party must be
involved: a former different-sex spouse, a sperm donor, a surrogate
mother, a parent or agency offering a child for adoption." 93
But no same-sex couple, regardless of how much they love a
child or how well they parent, can provide a child the benefits of his
or her own biological parents. Every child reared in a same-sex home
has been deliberately made to be motherless or fatherless. Through
marriage, the State may act to encourage children to be reared by a
father and a mother bound by biological and legal ties.
There is no generally applicable social science evidence that
children reared by a same-sex couple do as well as children reared by
their own biological parents. In fact, the most significant research to
date comparing children reared by their own parents with children
reared by a same-sex couple is from Australia. Professor Sotirios
Sarantakos9' studied 174 children of similar age, gender, and socio-
economic characteristics. There were 58 children living with their
own married parents, 58 children living with an opposite-sex
cohabiting couple and 58 children living with a same-sex cohabiting
couple. In almost every measure used in the study, children reared by
their own biological parents performed best, followed by children in
an opposite-sex cohabiting home. Children reared in a same-sex
home performed significantly worse. Long before Sarantakos, every
major civilization has known and practiced the conclusion that
marriage between a man and a woman provides, in general, the best
environment for rearing children.
The fact that the State permits same-sex couples to rear children
does not mean the State must ignore that the best, and most naturally
92. Although states are free to regulate the parameters of adoption. Lofton v. Sec'y
of the Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (llthCir. 2004), reh'g en banc
denied 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S.Ct. 869 (2005).
93. William Eskridge, Jr., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 81 (1996) (emphasis
added).
94. Sotirios Sarantakos, "Children in Three Contexts: Family, Education and Social
Development," CHILDREN AUSTRALIA, 1996, Volume 21, Number 3, pages 23-61.
convenient for that matter, environment for rearing children is in the
context of their own married parents. The unavoidable truth is that
opposite-sex couples will procreate and establish an immediate and
powerful bond with their children. That society relies upon married
parents of opposite sexes to provide the optimal environment for
rearing children is far from irrational. In fact, the State has a
compelling interest in continuing to recognize marriage as the union
of a man and a woman. Good lawyers don't ignore the personal
perspective.95
C. Conceiving the Marriage Debate for the Better, Not the Worst:
Evaluating the Rationality of Trendy Demands to Deconstruct
Marriage
Viewing the marriage question from the three aforementioned
perspectives confirms the invalidity of same-sex "marriage."
Nevertheless, either undaunted by or ignorant of these matters, same-
sex "marriage" advocates press other theories in search of legal
justification for altering marriage's long-recognized and protected
fundamental structure. These efforts, though retaining a surface
plausibility, wither under informed scrutiny.
1. Same-Sex "Marriage" and Lawrence's Purported Liberty Interest.
From Sodomy to Sacrament?
The debate concerning the structure of marriage has recently
been reintroduced in Lawrence v. Texas. 6 While Lawrence can be
significantly criticized,7 if taken at face value, that ruling militates
against same-sex "marriage."
95. This is true collectively, as the foregoing explains, but is also true individually
when the focus is concentrated upon the design of the marital union, as is discussed infra
at p. 139-142.
96. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
97. Certainly Justice Scalia's dissent contains a barrage of valid criticisms. Moreover,
in the author's opinion, the thrust of Lawrence can also be questioned given its (1) ruling
from and relying upon an ambiguous paper thin record; (2) reaching a decision
unnecessarily, that is, one not demanded by the statute in question; (3) confusing a policy
choice with a constitutional question; (4) arbitrarily jettisoning precedent and the Rule of
Law; (5) invoking an arbitrary referent for historical consideration, thereby committing
the fallacy of prejudicial chronological bias; (6) wrongly utilizing foreign precedent; and
(7) arbitrarily utilizing foreign precedent by ignoring the predominate weight of
international authority concerning such questions. For a survey broader than Lawrence of
international jurisprudential practices concerning same-sex relationships, see, FOCUS ON
THE FAMILY United Nations Department Briefing (compiled and updated February 18,
2004 by Thomas W. Jacobson) cataloging the laws of 135 nations.
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First, Lawrence explicitly disavows its application to marriage.98
Second, Lawrence may not even have involved a fundamental liberty
interest. Indeed, subsequent decisions have read Lawrence to simply
apply a rational basis test toa criminal law.'
Third, even if Lawrence does involve a fundamental liberty
interest or substantive due process right - again a debatable point -
the Court's due process jurisprudence makes plain that same-sex
"marriage" fails to qualify as a claimed right entitled to constitutional
protection. This is because under existing law, a claimed right exists,
if and only if, it is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.""
Rather plainly, same-sex "marriage" is decidedly not
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
And, referring to trendy European or Canadian rulings violates this
nation's fundamental due process law. Such references by definition
are immaterial under Glucksberg.
Even more striking is the fact that Glucksberg involved the
ultimate private, intimate, consensual decision: assisted suicide.
Nevertheless, the Court firmly rejected elevating this private,
intimate, consensual decision to constitutional proportions, ruling:
Here... we are confronted with a consistent and almost
universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right,
and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally
ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we
would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice,
and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every
State. 101
Plainly, some conduct is unacceptable despite its being private,
intimate, and consensual. This rationale applies with even more vigor
to the same-sex "marriage" question because marriage is decidedly
not a private matter; rather, marriage is a public institution. Similarly,
merely because something is deemed "not illegal" does not compel
the conclusion that the State must positively endorse the conduct.
Such reasoning is again fallacious.' °2
98. Lawrence 539 U.S. at 558, 578, 585 (2003)(Kennedy J., writing for the majority
and O'Connor J., concurring).
99. See Standhardt v. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. CDt. App. 2003); see also Lewis v.
Harris No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003)
(unpublished decision).
100. See Washington v. Gluckberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
101. Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
102. Confusing public and private matters mixes modalities, and arguing from "non-
criminal" to endorsement commits the naturalistic or "is/ought" fallacy.
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Fourth, Lawrence reached its holding in part by referencing the
perceived trend of the law as related to the decriminalization of
consensual adult sodomy."0 3 Indisputably, the predominant trend in
American jurisprudence is to define and protect marriage as being the
union of one man and one woman) °  Upon this basis alone, Lawrence
undercuts any claim for same-sex "marriage." Accordingly, though
Lawrence served as the spur for the current discussion of this issue,
accurately read, that decision in no way justifies same-sex "marriage."
2. Same-sex "Marriage": Can Privacy or Equal Protection Justify?
a. A Privacy Justification?
To be sure, a marital union includes privacy interests under
extant precedent.0  However, it is the union - not the individual -
who enjoys that right. The right to privacy inheres in the essence of
marriage; it does not create that essence, nor can it do so.
Axiomatically then, not every relationship that enjoys some
component of privacy is deemed to be "marriage" - an obvious, but
often forgotten, point.
In addition from a philosophical perspective, privacy seeks to
exclude governmental intrusion. In direct contrast however, with
marriage, the parties are demanding governmental intrusion. Relying
on privacy in this context is incoherent, and thus, "privacy" is to
same-sex "marriage" as is a glass slipper is to a clubfoot.
b. An Equal Protection Justification?
A frequent refrain during the same-sex "marriage" debate is
"equality" and "equal protection." Advocates for same-sex
103. This methodology is flawed because it commits the naturalistic fallacy by
attempting to derive an "ought" from an "is." And, it is problematic for the independent
reason that under stare decisis it allows no methodological room for a reversal of the trend
- its analysis only travels one way. Nevertheless, taken at its face, this methodology still
militates against same-sex "marriage."
104. By my calculations, at least 40 states have passed DOMA legislation as has the
United States. Moreover, as of November 2, 2004, 14 states have taken the additional step
of amending their constitutions to reconfirm that marriage is the union of one man and
one woman: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Dakota, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah; these states joined Hawaii,
Alaska, Nebraska, and Nevada, who had previously amended their constitutions, and
similar efforts are progressing in Massachusetts. Some of these state amendments
continue in litigation. See Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Attorney General,
Memorandum Decision and Order, May 12, 2005 addressing the Nebraska amendment,
available at http://www.alliancealert.org/20O5/2005051203.pdf.
105. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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"marriage" attempt to bridge the gap between the essences of
marriage and either sexual orientation or gender considerations. The
seeming plausibility of such comparisons lacks merit.
1. Equal Protection: Operative Principles
Equal Protection "guarantees equal laws, not equal results."
'16
Classifications are drawn each time a Legislature makes law. The
Equal Protection Clause will subject suspect classifications 7 to laws
that impinge fundamental rights.No constitutional, statutory, or common law authority exists to
support the proposition that same-sex "marriage" is a fundamental
right. The fundamental right to marry has always meant the right to
enter a legal union between a man and a woman. When the United
States criminalized polygamy in U.S. territories, the Supreme Court
upheld these laws based upon the historical meaning of marriage in
England and the colonies.'" Murphy articulated the essence of
marriage:
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit
to take rank as one of the coordinate States of the Union, than that
which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as
consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one
woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in
social and political improvement.'09
Maynard v. Hill, described marriage "as creating the most
important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and
civilization of a people than any other institution" and as "the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.
106. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)
(emphasis added).
107. The Supreme Court has identified only three suspect classes: Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race), Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879) (race);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national and ethnic origin); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage).
108. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S 145, 166 (1878) (upholding polygamy
conviction); Murphy, 114 U.S. 15 (1885) (upholding law prohibiting polygamists from
voting).
109. Id. at 45.
110. 125 U.S. 190, 205,211 (1888).
Maynard's description of marriage's import was invoked and
underpins the fundamental right to marry cases.'
No federal or state court has ever suggested that the fundamental
right to marriage means anything other than a right to enter the legal
union of a man and a woman. Redefining the term is not the
judiciary's option since that would be purely a legislative function.
Same-sex "marriage" advocates are not seeking to correct a
misapplication of regulatory power to marriage; rather, these
advocates are walking the same analytic aisle with the polygamists
because in each situation, the altar they seek demands the structural
obliteration of marriage. Lohengrin may be playing, but the
Valkyries are circling.
2. As to Sexual Orientation
No federal court has ever held that sexual orientation is a suspect
class. In Dean v. District of Columbia,"' Judge Ferran wrote,
"[H]omosexuals comprise neither a 'suspect' class mandating 'strict
scrutiny' of the statutory bar against same-sex marriage, nor a 'quasi-
suspect' class requiring 'intermediate scrutiny' of the marriage
barrier." '113
Federal courts of appeal have unanimously found that sexual
orientation is not a suspect class.114
111. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating law prohibiting
Caucasians from marrying African-Americans); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978) (invalidating law prohibiting remarriage for individuals who failed to pay child
support); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down ban on marital
contraception). Griswold's context, contraception, has no application for anyone but
opposite-sex couples. See id. at 485. All of the fundamental right to marry cases involved a
man and a woman. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (involving the marriage between a black man
and a white woman); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (involving a man delinquent on his child
support payments who wanted to marry a woman); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (discussing marriage and procreation); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96
(1987) (holding that prison inmates had the right to enter a legal union).
112. 653 A.2d 307 D.C. 1995).
113. Id. at 333 (Ferran, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
heightened scrutiny of "don't ask, don't tell" policy); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292
(5th Cir. 1985) (applying rational basis review to Texas sodomy statute), overruled on
other grounds, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 292-93 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
city's charter amendment concerning sexual orientation was subject to review "under the
most common and least rigorous equal protection norm (the 'rational relationship' test"));
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990)
(holding that a "deferential standard of review" was applicable to military regulation
regarding homosexuals); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied
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Similarly, every state but one that has considered whether sexual
orientation is "suspect"shas concluded that it is not."5
Lawrence, as mentioned, is not to the contrary. Confirming this
point, a post Lawrence case declined to recognize homosexuality as a
suspect class."6 Thus, Lawrence is no marital aid to same-sex couples
in their effort to obtain suspect class status.
3. As to Gender
Gender-based discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny:
For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection
scrutiny it must be established that the challenged classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."7
As a threshold matter, it must be shown that a statute
discriminates in favor of one sex over the other. Stated another way,
a statute must employ a discriminatory means of preferring one sex to
another. Then, and only then, may the statute's objects be
scrutinized.
Marriage statutes permit either sex to marry a person of the
opposite sex. Because both sexes are treated equally, there is no
discrimination against one sex to the benefit of another. Males are not
preferred, and females are not disfavored. Females are not preferred,
sub nom. Richenberg v. Cohen, 522 U.S. 807 (1997) (rejecting that homosexuals are a
"suspect classification" requiring strict scrutiny); Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard,
124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1998) (stating that
"homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class" and military "don't ask
don't tell" policy is only subject to "rational basis review"); Rich v. Secretary of the Army,
735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) ("classification based on one's choice of sexual
partners is not suspect"); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding
that a group defined by homosexual conduct "cannot constitute a suspect class");
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1003 (1990) (holding that homosexuals are not in a "class to which heightened scrutiny
must be afforded").
115. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 878 n.10 (Vt. 1999) (listing cases). The
single exception, Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. App. 1998)
employs a truncated analysis and relies on a unique Oregon constitutional provision. Id.
at 446-47. The Oregon Supreme Court, notwithstanding Tanner, recently invalidated
numerous same-sex "marriages" in light of the recent Oregon constitutional provision
affirming marriage as between one man and one woman. Li v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91
(2005).
116. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 P.3d 804 (11"' Cir.
2004).
117. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. L.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal
punctuation omitted).
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and males are not disfavored. Each sex is permitted to marry on the
same basis as the other.
In addition marriage statutes are not invalid on the plea that any
distinction involving sex violates equal protection. The Supreme
Court rejects this theory noting that "[jiust as neutral terms can mask
discrimination that is unlawful, gender specific terms can mark a
permissible distinction. The equal protection question is whether the
distinction is lawful.",11
8
Only an illogical sophistry could find that the State's implicit
preclusion of same-sex "marriages" is tantamount to a preference of
one sex to another. 119
3. Dispelling Common Misconceptions and Other Legal
Prestidigitation
a. A Bifurcated Public Square: The Artificial "Civil Marriage"
Distinction
Another seemingly plausible, but analytically defective notion
asserts that the same-sex "marriage" question is limited to "civil
marriage" and thus, will in no way impact "religious" marriage. This
assertion is often conjoined with the (wrong) idea that marriage is
simply a pre-determined conglomerate of benefits. This assertion is
as factually naive as it is philosophically irrational.
First, this assertion is self-refuting because it contradicts a main
point underlying same-sex "marriage" advocacy - namely that
marriage is a fundamental human right. If indeed marriage is a
fundamental human right, then it follows that there could be no moral
- let alone legal - justification for any group - including a religious
group - to deny someone a fundamental human right by refusing to
solemnize their same-sex "marriage." Put differently, no logical
brakes exist for limiting same-sex "marriage" exclusively to a "civil"
sphere. 120
118. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
119. The absurdity of these rationales is also illustrated by the fact that they would also
mandate the elimination of all cultural distinctions of gender: segregated public restrooms,
athletic competitions segregated by nothing more than gender. Hmmm...
120. And, the same-sex "marriage" advocates are being less than candid with this
assertion since they seek "full equality"-as they define it. Plainly, the "fullness" sought is
not limited to benefits access, but also includes the "status" conferred and recognized
within the culture in its entirety. Same-sex "marriage" is the starting point only; the goal is
obtaining the State's and the culture's blessing. Evan Wolfson, Marriage Equality and
Some Lessons for the Scary Work of Winning, presented at the National Lesbian and Gay
Law Association "Lavender Law" Conference (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
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Second, this notion is mistaken because it wrongly assumes that
people live their lives in tidy categories and never move among the
121 ,otevarious realms of the public square. In other words, this assumes
that people of faith never own and operate businesses in which they
seek to express their First Amendment associative rights, including
practices informed by their faith.22  Illustrating this point, one can
reference the Lambda Legal website. There, guides have been
produced for assisting "married" same-sex couples to integrate their
"family" into key social sectors, including: work, the public
community, and even the religious community."l
These assimilation efforts implicitly recognize that citizens living
in the public square do not wear only one associational hat. And, the
public square does include religion. However, as Professor White
asserted,24 a strong antithesis exists between homosexuality and
Christianity. As a result, religion does not remain "neutral" or
unimpacted. Quite the contrary: when same-sex unions become part
of a prevailing "politically correct" orthodoxy by receiving the State's
imprimatur, religious persecution results:
While proponents of same-sex unions disavow any intention
of demanding that religious bodies recognize or participate in
solemnizing these unions, the experience in other Western
European countries should give us pause. For example, two
Canadian provinces recognize same-sex unions as marriages
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/document.asp?doc-id=1937 (last visited Jan. 18, 2005);
See also, Civil Rights. Community. Movement, (Jan. 13, 2005), jointly adopted by the
American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian & Gay Rights Project; Equality Federation;
Freedom to Marry; Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders; Gay & Lesbian Alliance
Against Defamation; Gay & Lesbian Victory Fund and Leadership Institute; Gay, Lesbian
and Straight Education Network; Human Rights Campaign; Lambda Legal; Log Cabin
Republicans; Mautner Project; National Association of LGBT Community Centers;
National Black Justice Coalition; National Center for Lesbian Rights; National Center for
Transgender Equality; National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs; National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force; National Youth Advocacy Coalition; Parents, Families and Friends of
Lesbians and Gays; Servicemembers Legal Defense Network; Sigamos Adelante: National
Latino/Hispanic LGBT Leadership; and Stonewall Democrats, available at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=PressRoom&CONTENTID=24793&TEMPL
ATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Jan. 18,2005).
121. This is yet another fruit of failing to employ a balanced, tri-perspectival analysis.
By emphasizing only the norm of civil marriage, and not allowing that concept to be
informed by the situational and personal realities impacting marriage, only a truncated and
skewed similitude of marriage can result.
122. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
123. See, generally. http://www.lambdalegal.org.
124. See supra note 2.
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by judicial fiat. In that same country, there have been criminal
convictions under hate speech laws for publication of an
advertisement opposing same-sex marriage that merely cited
Bible verses without quoting the verses. In Ireland the Irish
Council on Civil Liberties has publicly threatened "[cflergy
and bishops who distribute the Vatican's latest publication
describing homosexual activity as "evil" could face
prosecution under incitement to hatred legislation." In Spain,
Madrid's Cardinal Varela gave a sermon condemning gay
marriage. He has been sued by the Spanish Gay Advocates
for "slander and an incitement to discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. "s In England, self defense was denied to
a pastor who defended himself when assaulted by several
attackers while carrying a sign citing Bible verses regarding
homosexual conduct. In Sweden, a pastor who has been
charged with hate speech for a sermon condemning
homosexual acts."25
Third, this assertion proves too much. If "marriage" consists
only of civil benefits and nothing else, then the solution to perceived
"inequality" is to develop civil tools to ensure predicable legal
relationships - not deconstruct marriage.126
b. False Conception: The Infertile Couple Red Herring
When responding to the rather obvious State interest in
channeling procreation into opposite-sex marriage,127  same-sex
"marriage" advocates quickly note that not all couples are fertile, and
moreover, that some couples decline to procreate for other reasons.
Both points are true, but irrelevant to the issue at hand.
That the State possesses a strong justification for supporting and
regulating marriage between one man and one woman does not mean
that the purpose of marriage is procreation. To so conclude commits
an analytic error of confusing the distinction between intrinsic goods
and instrumental goods." It is only in the latter case that marriage is
125. Id. Hearing Before the Minn. H.R. Comm. on Rules and Leg. Admin.; 78th Reg.
Sess., (Mar. 17, 2004) (prepared testimony of Professor Teresa Stanton Collett).
126. Interestingly, given the premise that marriage only consists of benefits, why would
one arbitrarily limit the conferral of those benefits to those who are married? Why not
devise a more inclusive economic litmus that evaluates which relationships - of whatever
variety or convenience - deserve or demand benefits. At this point, the rationale advanced
for same-sex "marriage" is grossly under-inclusive and thereby displays selective and
arbitrary narrow-mindedness.
127. See notes 81-96.
128. An instrumental good serves as a means to another end, but is not inherently
good. In contrast, an intrinsic good, may produce other goods, but its goodness stands
alone irrespective of those consequent goods, which may or may not follow. See GEORGE,
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deemed to be for the purpose of procreation. The reality, however, is
that marriage itself, as a complementary union, comprises an intrinsic
good.
Finally, even absent fertility, the intimate acts of opposite sex
couples remain reproductive in type, thereby reinforcing the
pedagogical function of law.'29 So the infertile octogenarian retort is
an impotent straw man, devoid of legal vitality.
c. Wearing Logical and Legal Blinders: Ignoring that Polygamists
Are People Too
The rationales typically advanced in support of same-sex
"marriage" also carry the water for other innovations that similarly
seek to deconstruct marriage, including polygamy. As recognized by
the Supreme Court, marriage properly defined consists of both a
quantitative as well as a qualitative component: Marriage is for two
people, one of which is necessarily a man, and the other of which is
necessarily a woman. 3' Same-sex "marriage" advocates are currently
attacking the qualitative element - disputing the necessity of man
and woman.
However, the rationales being advanced in this endeavor - legal
and emotional - logically entitle the bi-sexual to "be fulfilled" by
"marrying both a man and a woman." Put popularly: " Why deprive
this poor bi-guy his self-fulfillment and punish his family - he's a
sexual minority too!" "Who are we to judge?!!" And indeed, one
same-sex "marriage" advocate owns, and has owned for over a
decade, the logical implications of their assertions:
The ACLU believes that criminal and civil laws prohibiting or
penalizing the practice of plural marriage violate constitutional
protections of freedom of expression and association, freedom of
religion, and privacy for personal relationships between consenting
adults."'
supra note 55, at 117.
129. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
130. See Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45.
131. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICY MANUAL (1992). Notably, during
a formal debate conducted January 19, 2005, at Rutgers Law School (Camden) against
Professor Sally Goldfarb, both she and a lesbian colleague expressed great incredulity and
disdain for the comparison this author proffered between same-sex "marriage" and
polygamy, contending that such was a non-existent "slippery slope." Providently, that
very date, the Yale Daily News carried a story quoting ACLU President Nadine Stroseen
as candidly acknowledging that the ACLU has "defended the right for individuals to
engage in polygamy." Following the debate, this story was provided that evening to
Professor Goldfarb, a Yale College and Law School graduate; she did not respond.
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This candor is at least refreshing, if also shocking. Note
carefully: the stated legal basis for embracing polygamy in all its
permutations stems from the same rationales employed to support the
relatively more tame marital deconstruction known as same-sex
"marriage." This is not a slippery slope, but a present and logically
demanded reality.
132
d. Who Shall Overcome: The Infelicity of the Loving Analogue
Often the same-sex "marriage" advocates assert that they are
only seeking "the right to marry the person they love." This may be
good rhetoric, but it is poor law. The reality is that the law has never
granted anyone a right to "marry the person they love." In fact, the
law, as it properly regulates marriage imposes a number of gateway
criteria for marriage: capacity; consent; the age of consent;
consanguinity; unmarried; and gender.'33 Consequently, both sides of
the debate must concede the goodness of some restrictions on marital
eligibility.1
3 4
At common law, no racial restriction existed. Rather, prompted
by segregationist sentiment, some, but not all, states imposed
miscegenation laws. The pertinent question here is whether such laws
are analogous to the qualitative requirement that marriage be
between a man and a woman. They are not.
In the first place, zealous advocates frequently make this claim as
if no one had ever advanced it previously, that is, as if the Supreme
Court had not considered Loving in relation to a claim seeking
constitutional recognition of same-sex "marriage." In fact, this very
claim shortly after Loving was tried, tested, and rejected.'
Ponder this: will today's vocal advocates of same-sex "marriage" now oppose the ACLU's
efforts regarding polygamy? Not likely. See, Crystal Paul-Laughinghouse, Leader of
ACLU Talks On Agenda, Yale Daily News Publishing Company Inc., at
http://yaledailynews.conarticlefunctions/Printerfriendly.asp?AID=27865 (last visited
April 14, 2005).
132. Confirming this reality is litigation advanced by self-identified polygamists Tom
Green and Rodney Holm seeking to establish a constitutional right to group "marriage."
See, e.g., Jonathan, Polygamy Laws Exposes Our Own Hypocrisy, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
2004, at 13A; see also Joseph A. Reaves and Mark Schaeffer, Polygamist Sect Target of
Arizona-Utah Inquiry, ARIZ. REP., Sept. 28, 2003.
133. Notably, the law does not require love between spouses, and rightly so since the
State lacks jurisdiction over the human heart. Compare that with "hate crime" legislation,
which predicates criminal liability upon the State's purported jurisdiction over the
accused's motive.
134. Thus, everyone presupposes some definition of marriage; marriage simply does
not, nor can it, exist in an undefined constant fluidity.
135. See Baker v. Nelson, see also supra text at 19-21.
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Second, the asserted analogy crumbles since race is immutable
whereas sexual conduct is mutable.136  The very rationale
underpinning Loving derives from the identifiable class incurring
disparate treatment: African Americans. No such class exists
regarding those seeking to enter same-sex "marriages." The actual
miscegenation cases confirm this analysis.
Third, and not to belabor a previous point, the proper analogue
to same-sex "marriage" is polygamy. This is true because in both
instances the essence of marriage, its structure, would be altered.
e. What's the Harm: Chicken Little Meets Tobacco Litigator
A final motif that permeates much same-sex "marriage"
discussion usually takes the form of a gauntlet: "What harm does Bill
marrying Ted do to your opposite sex marriage?"137 While technically
not a legal question, it remains a fair - and quite answerable -
question to public discourse.
At the outset, note that this question leap frogs over a key point:
some conduct - even among private consenting adults - is wrong
per se, such that a society will bar its practice: incest, polygamy,
dueling, assisted suicide, "'gladiator contests, and cannibalism. 139 The
136. This is obvious anecdotally: approximately 40% of those who had entered a
Vermont civil union had previously entered an opposite-sex marriage. REPORT OF
THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, Finding 3 and Appendix B,
Table 1-5 (Jan. 2002) (according to this report 77% had not been previously married or in
a civil union), http://www.leg.state.vt.uslbaker/Final%20CURC%2OReport%20for%
202002.htm
And then consider the well-publicized "conversions" to opposite sex marriage and
motherhood of noted self-defined lesbians: Sinead O'Connor, Julie Cypher, and Anne
Heche. How is this possible if "sexual orientation" is immutable? More problematic is
the utter impossibility of legally defining the operative class. Who would actually qualify
and how would the law be able to make that determination without being overly invasive
and/or analytically arbitrary? Would the putative class include (1) those with homosexual
ideations; (2) those engaging in homosexual behavior, and if so, in what context and in
what frequency; (3) those formerly engaged in homosexual conduct; (4) those formerly
engaged in heterosexual conduct; (5) those engaged in bisexual conduct; (6) those
formerly engaged in bisexual conduct; (7) those, though privately "heterosexual," who for
motives of (say) profit, engage in homosexual conduct; or (8) those, though privately
"homosexual," who for motives of (say) profit, engage in heterosexual conduct? Conduct
does not create class: A convincingly effeminate man is still a man; a convincingly
masculine woman is still a woman; and a convincingly white hip-hop artist like Marshall
Mathers is still white. Role playing is not reality.
137. Compare, e.g., comments of Dale Carpenter, remarks at debate on same sex
"marriage" to opponent, at the University of Virginia Law School, (Jan. 19, 2004).
138. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
139. Consider the German trial of Armin Meiwes, who by mutual consent, ate and
then murdered - in that order - his willing same-sex partner. See, e.g., Malcolm
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assumption, therefore, that same-sex "marriage" should be classified
as being intrinsically proper must be proven, not side-stepped."'°
Second, note the presupposition to the question: harm must be
immediate and discernable or else the target conduct must remain
legally unrestricted. No other area of public policy relies on such a
narrow view of harm. Initially, the question should not be Bill and
Ted's marriage per se, but rather, what cumulative impact that
legalizing same-sex "marriage" in general would precipitate. These
are very different questions.
In addition, the premise sounds more like a self-serving rationale
asserted by an unscrupulous tobacco harvester, who points to little
Johnny after he inhales his first few puffs and upon seeing "no harm,"
declares that smoking comports with public health. But not so fast. If
the question is what harm results from Johnny smoking one cigarette,
the answer is obvious: none. However, if the question becomes what
harm would one expect if Johnny continues to smoke four packs of
cigarettes daily for four decades, the answer is also obvious and quite
different.
In the same way, no reputable sociologist expected the sky to
crumble on May 17, 2004.42 However, the data do indicate that
serious harm does result when a culture abandons "absolute
monogamy."'43 So the harm question turns on the window of inquiry
- the timing of the expected harm. Same-sex "marriage" advocates
Thornberry, Germany Rattled by New Gay Cannibal, www.365Gay.com, Oct. 8, 2004,
(visited ian. 18, 2005) http:llwww.365gay.comlnewsconO41101l00804cannibal.htm.
140. For centuries, even pagan philosophers described sodomy, for example, as
something contrary to nature [paraphysin]. See, e.g., Plato, LAWS, section 636a-c. See
also, Peter Lubin and Dwight Duncan, Follow the Footnote, or Tthe Advocate as Historian
of Same-Sex Marriage, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1271, 1324 (1998).
141. To cite one example: many cities and even some states ban all smoking from any
public venue, whether privately owned or not. Why? Because the State deems the
potential for cumulative harm over time considerable. See, e.g., Conrad DeFiebre, The
Plan: Statewide Smoking Ban, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Jan. 15, 2005 ("California, New
York and five other states prohibit smoking in all workplaces, including bars and
restaurants. Seven Minnesota cities and four counties also have smoking bans, some with
exceptions for bars.") (visited Jan. 18, 2005). http://www.startribune
.com/stories/587/5187085.html.
142. This date coincides with the granting of same-sex "marriage" to Massachusetts
residents under Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
143. See e.g, JOSEPH DANIEL UNWIN, Ph.D., SEXUAL REGULATIONS AND CULTURAL
BEHAVIOR (Library of Congress HQ12.U52; Frank M. Darrow ed., Trona, California;
1969), (1935) (finding that when a culture abandons absolute monogamy, harm inexorably
results after 40 years).
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ignore this key point.'"
Third, the "no harm" shibboleth likewise ignores that the State
can properly proscribe conduct that cumulatively creates a risk of
harm. In other words, some conduct, if singular, insular, and non-
recurring, does not "harm" society. Examples would be driving at
night without headlamps; driving without seat belts; speeding; driving
while intoxicated; building stairs without hand rails; using a toilet with
"too much" flushing capacity. The point of all these regulations is an
informed acknowledgement that it is the cumulative impact of these
behaviors that require them to be proscribed. Same-sex "marriage"
advocates ignore this point.
Fourth, the long established pedagogical nature of law has been
forgotten.' Law proclaims policy. And what same-sex "marriage"
would proclaim is that the State should endorse by design motherless
and fatherless environments - something the law has for centuries
known to be less than optimal for the future generations.
Fifth, and related to the prior point are the data that establish
that the optimal environment for rearing children consists of a mother
and a father.'"6 Claims to the contrary are simply that - claims to the
contrary predicated upon invalid or otherwise unreliable
methodology, data, or both.'47
In particular, the research indicates that same-sex relationships
are environments that disproportionately impact children. Those
reared in such contexts experience poorer physical health; '4 poorer
144. The data indicate also that those cultures who have embraced same-sex unions
and their "relatives" have not seen the marital institution strengthened, but to the
contrary, have seen marriage crumble. See, e.g., Stanley Kurtz, Death Blow to Marriage,
http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200402050842.asp. This stands to reason: if
anything is marriage, then nothing is marriage.
145. Nearly two millennia ago, Paul expressed this truth this way: What then shall we
say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet if it had not been for the law, I would not have
known sin. I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, "You shall not
covet." Romans 7:7 (English Standard Version) (emphasis added).
146. FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL: WASHINGTON D.C. 2004, Peter Sprigg and
Timothy Dailey, co-editors, GETTING IT STRAIGHT: WHAT THE RESEARCH SHOWS
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY, Chapters 5 and 6, (Family Research Council: Peter Sprigg &
Timothy Dailey eds., Washington D.C., 2004).
147. ROBERT LERNER AND ALTHEA NAGAI, NO BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON'T
TELL US ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING (Marriage Law Project: Washington D.C., 2001).
In a nutshell, the studies proffered in favor of same-sex parenting are flawed because they
employ (1) sweeping generalizations; (2) defective statistical samples; (3) defective
qualitative samples; and (4) result-oriented, "targeted" research.
148. Ronald J. Angel & Jacqueline Worobey, Single Motherhood and Children's
Health, 29 J. OF HEALTH and & SOC. BEHAV 38, 48-49 (1988).
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mental health; 9 a greater likelihood of substance abuse;'-° a higher
risk of suicide;... and a higher likelihood of committing a crime that
leads to incarceration.'52
In addition, same-sex environments fail to optimize the health of
those adults living in them. The data13 indicate that same-sex co-
habitants enjoy less fidelity, 114 experience greater intimate partner
abuse, 155 and present greater incidents of psychological disorders. 16
149. Ollie Lundberg, The Impact of Childhood Living Conditions on Illness and
Mortality in Adulthood, 36 Soc. SCIENCE & MEDICINE 1047, 1050 &, Table 3 (1993);
Ronald L. Simons, et al., Explaining the Higher Incidence of Adjustment Problems of
Children of Divorce, 61 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAM 1020, 1028 (1999); Alan Booth & Paul
R. Amato, Parental Predivorce Relations and Offspring Postdivorce Well-Being, 63 J.
MARRIAGE & THE FAM 197, 205 (2001).
150. Robert L. Flewelling & Karl E. Bauman, Family Structure as a Predictor of Initial
Substance Use and Sexual Intercourse in Early Adolescence, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM 171,
175 & Table 2 (1990).
151. DAVID M. CUTLER, EDWARD L. GLAESER & KAREN NORBERG, EXPLAINING
THE RISE IN YOUTH SUICIDE, Working Paper 7713 at 32, (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 7713, (May 2000) (citing impact of divorce).
152. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 134
(2000).
153. The studies cited in the notes supporting this section target single mother homes.
This is because same-sex "marriage" advocates have urged that such environments are the
most analogous to same-sex environments. See, Charlotte J. Patterson, Family
Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM 1052 (2000). "It has
been widely believed that children living in families headed by divorced but heterosexual
mothers provide the best comparison group. " Id. at 1059.
154. JOSEPH HARRY, GAY COUPLES, 115 (1984) (65% of male couples had sex
outside the relationship within the first year and approximately 90% had sex outside the
relationship after five years). See also, DAVID P. MC WHIRTER & ANDREW H.
MATTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP 252-53 (1984);
compare, lesbian Camille Paglia's similar assessment:
After a period of optimism about the long-range potential of gay men's one-on-
one relationships, gay magazines are starting to acknowledge the more relaxed
standards operating here, with recent articles celebrating the bigger bang of sex
with strangers or proposing 'monogamy without fidelity'-the latest Orwellian
formulation to excuse having your cake and eating it too.
Camille Paglia, I'll Take Religion Over Gay Culture, Salon.com online magazine at 4 (June
1998), http://archive.salon.com/col/pagl/1998/06/23pag2.html.
155. See, PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT,
NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM
THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, 30 (U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 30, NCJ
181867, July 20002). (finding that among women, 39.2% of same-sex co-habitants and
21.7% of opposite sex co-habitants experience physical assault or stalking; and among men
the comparable features are 23.1 % and 7.4%).
See also, ENDING ABUSE IN LESBIAN, BISEXUAL WOMEN'S AND TRANSGENDER
COMMUNITIES, THE NETWORK/LA RED, (Dec. 13, 2002) ("1 in 4 GLBT people are
battered by a partner"); see also Press Release, Anti-violence Project Press Release,
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Harm does inure to Bill and Ted.
Certainly lawyers can and will quibble about the evidentiary
weight to be attributed to the battle of experts, but the point is that
many facets of "harm" do exist and to dismiss out of hand the notion
of harm associated with same-sex co-habitation is both na've and
irresponsible.57
4. Avoiding Design Defects: The Role of Inference in Rationally
Analyzing the Marriage Debate
When driving along Interstate 90, there comes a point when a
large edifice comes to view. On the edifice are amazing carvings,
carvings depicting men from America's history. Consider the almost
imperceptible, yet strongly present role inference plays in viewing the
treasure of Mt. Rushmore. As one sees those carvings, does one
conclude that the winds must have been really special to have eroded
the face of the cliff so that it appeared to resemble faces? Of course
not. Rather, one infers that something or someone designed those
National Coalition of Anti-violence Programs Releases Annual Report on Domestic
Violence (Sept. 24, 2002) (on file with author) (5,046 cases of homosexual domestic
violence in 2001); and DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE
MEN WHO LOVE THEM: BATTERED GAY MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (1991)
(estimating 500,000 male homosexual victims).
156. See, e.g., Theo G. M. Sandfort, et al, Same-sex Sexual Behavior and Psychiatric
Disorders: Findings from the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study
(NEMESIS), 58 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 85, 86 (January 2001): Homosexuals
had significantly higher levels of psychological disorders in nearly every category
measured. Id. at 88, Table 2. Moreover, "[m]ore homosexual men than heterosexual men
had 2 or more [DSM-III-R] disorders, both lifetime and in the preceding year....
Homosexual women were more likely than heterosexual women to have had 2 or more
[DSM-III-R] disorders during their lifetime but not in the preceding year." Id. at 87-88.
(emphasis added). The authors suggested that "the study might underestimate the
differences between homosexual and heterosexual people .... " Id. at 89. They concluded
that the "study offers evidence that homosexuality is associated with a higher prevalence
of psychiatric disorders. The outcomes are in line with findings from earlier studies in
which less rigorous designs have been employed." Id. at 90. (emphasis added).
157. These considerations stand in addition to those health considerations associated
with same-sex intimate conduct. The incidence of STDs among those practicing
homosexual behavior likewise presents questions for governmental consideration. See,
e.g., Mark Worrall, Syphilis Transmission Rampant Through Internet Hookups,
www.365gay.com, Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/121803netSyph.htm
(article citing Center for Disease control Dec. 19 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
noting that of the 2003 reported cases of syphilis in San Francisco, 90% (450/500) were
attributable to homosexual males). Similarly, the rates of bacterial vaginnosis reported
among lesbian women exceed that experienced by women in other intimate relationships:
Barbara J. Berger, et al., Bacterial Vaginosis in Lesbians: A Sexually Transmitted Disease,
21 CLINICAL INFECriOUS DISEASES, 1402 (1995). 29% (lesbians); 19% university health
services; 17% STD clinics (emphasis added).
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carvings.
Similarly, when one enters the beautiful city of Vancouver, B.C.
a wondrous bed of flowers presents a message: "Welcome to
Vancouver." Again, what inferences ought to be drawn? That the
winds randomly blew just the right color flowering seeds in the right
proportions at just the right time so that the words - in modern
English no less - would appear? Again, of course not. One knows
better and one knows better because of the operation of rational
inference.
This same principle operates when observing natural
phenomena: meteorologists infer from the design of fallen crops
whether the violent storm consisted of a microburst or a tornado.
The evidence drives the inference. And, this is true even if the design
is "natural."
And, this is true of human interaction as well. When a fire
occurs, a determination is made as to whether it was "of suspicious
origin." Arson inspectors do what? They look at the evidence. For
what? They look for indicia of design. When that evidence exists,
they infer that arson occurred. Inference informs.
In the same vein, the popular TV show, CSI and its progeny are
predicated upon inference: a human body is found and the question is
whether the evidence support a mere natural death, a death of
unfortunate providence, or is there a more sinister conclusion: a
murder. It is the evidence and whether it bears the design of murder
that drives the analysis.
Inference surrounds what it means to live as humans. Sadly, the
evident design of being human, especially as configured as male and
female is neglected in the same-sex "marriage" arena - to the
detriment of all concerned. Rather obviously, men and women are
designed and moreover, that evidence of design depicts at the very
least a biological complementarity. But there's more.
Design implies function. To ignore design is to risk malfunction.
If a car's wheels are not aligned, that is, they are in disorder,
operating the car - while not producing immediate harm - will
certainly impede - and then over time incrementally destroy - the
car's functionality. And tragic personal injury could result as well.
This is why car manufacturers and just about every other widget
maker supply owner's manuals. Indeed, the law of torts incorporates
the notion of design and misuse into the law of product liability. And,
a failure to warn - failing to direct usage according to the product's
design and potentiality - can engender liability. Yet, there's even
more.
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The design of being human is not some mystery. Rather, it is
something so foundational that "we can't not know it..'. We can
suppress it, but only to personal and societal detriment. Design
matters, whether the topic is weed killers, posthole diggers, open
heart surgery, or marriage and its attendant intimacies. When in
doubt, maybe the directions should be followed; maybe design does
matter. This is nothing radical, but is prudent. Maybe what is radical
is unfettered self-directed autonomy. 9
One need not be a Christian or even "religious" to understand
this reality. In fact, the late professor Arthur Leff made this point
profoundly when he noted that:
Napalming babies is bad; starving the poor is wicked; buying and
selling each other is depraved; ... there is in the world such a thing as
evil - SEZ WHO??!! 160
In the same way, we can't not know that mankind is created in
two complementary genders of equal dignity, so wonderfully designed
such that:
the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the
union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of
matrimony; [is] the sure foundation of all that is stable and
noble in our civilization; [as well as] the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress
in social and political improvement."
Maybe, just maybe, the Supreme Court spoke some truth prior to
1947.162 Maybe the Court indeed understood certain foundational
matters, matters that, though often suppressed, remain "what we
158. J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNOW (Spence Publishing Company:
Dallas, Texas, 2003).
159. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 U.S. 2791, 2807
(1992) (regarding the sweet mystery of life passage). Compare, Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).
160. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L. J. 1229,
1249 (1979).
161. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
162. In 1947 with Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court began
injecting non-historical irrationality into Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court
did so by predicating legal doctrine upon a privately voiced, figurative metaphor: the "wall
of separation between church and State" which "must be kept high and impregnable." Id. at
16, 18. The subsequent mythical and non-historical application of this private Jeffersonian
metaphor to the public square has been well-documented, albeit largely ignored by jurists
and liberal separationists alike. See, DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, (NYU Press: NY, 2002);
and PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, (Harvard University
Press: Cambridge, MA; 2002). The resultant crabbed jurisprudence is yet another
example of what occurs when the Situational perspective is ignored in law.
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can't not know." Matters that ring true. Matters that matter. Only
by recognizing this reality can rationality be restored to the same-sex
"marriage" debate.
Conclusion
To be authentically human is to be rational. Destroying
rationality also destroys humanity. Same-sex "marriage" Tests On
irrationality. Its thesis can only exist by ignoring precedent, ignoring
history, and ignoring the operation of design and inference.
Therefore, the reasoning that promotes same-sex "marriage" is
reasoning that ultimately mars what it means to be human.
Embracing same-sex "marriage" would therefore not create a
world of expanded rights, but one of expanded irrationality, a world
of decreasing humanity. This would be the world of onion-less onion
rings, married bachelors, and square circles. Whether liberal or
conservative, faithful or faithless, prudish or promiscuous the fact is:
No one reading this article actually believes - in their heart of hearts
- in square circles. It is time to stop pretending that the law can
draw them.
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